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 Suppose a new flue – or another transient,
minor health problem – occasionally con-
strains you to stay briefly away from work.
Should you – or your employer or society at
large – in such circumstances secure you full
reimbursement of the resulting wage loss? 
Insurance of that sort were indeed offered
in the former Soviet Union, and it is still part
of social security in some European countries
(including Norway
1). Clearly, so extreme a
policy affects supply, demand and produc-
tivity of labor – as well as incentives. 
So, there are ample reasons to inquire
about its appropriateness and impacts. In
particular, I ask here: What does full coverage
indicate about the actuarial fairness of the
premium? How does such a policy fare in terms
of risk sharing? Why is there no coinsurance?
What does absence of a deductible reveal in terms
of risk aversion? Will the policy provide efficient
mutual insurance? Are worries with hazard well
accounted for?
Concerning these and other questions I
shall assemble some observations, each
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01 NOPEC 30 (2) Flåm  11-01-05  14:34  Side 79inviting strong doubts about the efficiency of
full insurance. The arguments that follow are
simple, but ought not be overlooked. Few,
albeit some, results collected below are
original. In fact, most appear well known, but
scattered in the literature. 
The paper is organized as a review of chief
theoretical results contrasted with a specific
insurance treaty. That sort of review should
interest threesorts of readers. Firstcome policy
oriented analysts, willing to scrutinize an
existing arrangement. Second  in line are
insurance economists or actuaries concerned
with the operation and justification of systems
already in place. And third, there are social
scientists interested in theoretical perspectives
on the efficiency and equity of distributional
schemes. While some sections are technical,
others are not. The reader can skip sections
that appear not to his heart, pick others freely,
and still take home a message or two. 
There is, however, a generality to the paper
that goes beyond the particular instance of
short spell sickness. Indeed, the paper bears
on full (private or social) insurance of
recurrent but relatively small losses. For an
example, suppose your new bicycle is stolen
every so often and never recovered. To protect
against that repeated and notable, yet minor
loss you might arrange ex ante for complete
indemnity. In fact, full theft insurance is
available in some bicycle shops. Should you
reasonably by it? Plainly, if the premium is
fair or subsidized, any risk averse, rational,
bicycle-owner would purchase full coverage.
He might moreover, opt to park his bicycle
unlocked. 
The silliness of providing such insurance
seems to preempt this paper. Objections are
indeed straightforward, even trivial, not
worthy of closer scrutiny. Discussed here,
however, is a mandatory contract, affecting
solidarity and redistribution. Given the
observed use and effects of that contract, I
find it important to voice some concerns with
its design, efficiency, and welfare impact. 
Is Full Coverage a Good Choice?
It appears reasonable and realistic to presume,
from here on, that most agents dislike risk.
How will such agents behave if offered full
insurance? Mossin (1968) already addressed
that issue:
Proposition 1.(On purchase of full insurance)
• If the agent is strictly risk averse, he is willing
to pay more than the actuarially fair premium
for full coverage.
• However, only if the premium does not exceed
the actuarially fair level, will he purchase full
coverage.
• If moreover, his absolute risk aversion decreases,
his willingness to pay for insurance decreases as
he becomes more wealthy.
Are these assertions relevant? As said, I think
it safe to assume that typical agents be risk
averse (even regarding minor, relative
infrequent losses). Even more, I posit here that
they be strictly averse, but less so when
accumulating more wealth.
2 Also, since the
operation of any insurance agency comes at a
certain cost, the premium charged typically
exceeds, or it should exceed, the actuarially
fair level. Consequently, viewing the three
bullets above, one may expect that the
concerned parties demand some insurance,
albeit not full coverage – and less of it as they
become better off. In contrast, and as a matter
of fact, I observe that unions of workers insist
on complete reimbursement of minor wage
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spokesmen of those unions have steadily
become more prosperous. Do these observa-
tions overthrow the empirical validity of
Proposition 1? No, not at all. It merely reveals
the simple circumstance that the insurance at
hand is subsidized. 
Is the Risk Sharing Efficient?
In general it seems prudent that contracting
parties agree on efficient arrangements.
Efficiency simply means that they underwrite
a treaty which leaves no room for improving
the lot of one party without inflicting losses
on the other. 
In our context suppose an insurance policy
is agreed upon which stipulates indemnity 
I (x) to be paid by the employer (or insurance
provider) to the employe in case of wage loss
The first party (the employer) has wealth  W,
utility function U (.) and receives a premium π
from the second party (the worker) who holds
wealth w and utility function u (.). For good
and obvious reasons I tacitly assume that 
0 ≤ I (x) ≤ x≥– and that any utility function
be concave, smooth, and strictly monotone.
In addition, suppose here that u′′(.) < 0.This
last assumption is reasonable: It simply says
that the insured party is strictly risk averse
(although maybe moderately so). Efficiency
then entails existence of a positive constant
such that marginal utilities are always equal
for the two parties:3
U′(W + π − I (x)) = µu′ (w −π  − x + I (x))
for all losses x. (1)
Equation (1) comes from maximizing the
Pareto-like objective 
E {U (W + π − I (x)) + µu (w −π  − x + I (x))}
with respect to I (.), the positive parameter µ
being the relative welfare weight ascribed to
the insured. Note that the employer (or
insurer) could be risk neutral. 
Proposition 2. (Risk sharing and coinsurance
(Moffet, 1979)) It follows from (1) that
0 < I′(x) < 1. Thus concerns with efficiency
implies some degree and form of coinsurance. 
Full coverage for short spell sickness is
certainly not up to the standard recommended
by Proposition 2. This fact notwithstanding,
the extreme outcome I (x) = x might become
explicable by assigning zero welfare weight to
the employer. However, absent dictatorial
power to the proletariat, such rulings are
hardly defendable. 
Proposition 2 advocates that partial self-
insurance be built into a good policy.
Specifically, it seems reasonable that the
insured agent fully covers a first, lower part of
the risk. That is, up to a certain level D he
must fend for himself. Thus, he would hold a
cap-loss policyof the type I(x) = max {x − D, 0}
where D > 0 is called the deductible. A problem
appears here though: The cap-loss format
violates (when differentiable) the above result
0 < I′(x) < 1. Operating expenses for the
insurance business change the picture,
however. As seen next, they set things right: 
Should there be a Deductible?
As noted, some existing insurance policies for
short spell sickness offer full coverage, require
no coinsurance, and demand no deductible.
Can such policies reasonably be justified?
Social insurance of short spell sickness? 81
3. Quite reasonably, one could posit that no loss yields no indemnity – that is, 
I (0) = 0 – to have µ = U′(W + π)/u′(w – π).
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account, Arrow (1963) proved the following
Proposition 3. (Coverage only above a
deductible) If any insurance policy is available
at a premium which depends merely on its
actuarial value, then it becomes optimal for a
risk-averse buyer to secure himself coverage –
and in fact, full coverage – of own loss only above
a deductible minimum.
Thus the agent takes full self-insurance up to
a deductible D.4
For any indemnity schedule I(.), marketed
at premium π the loading factor l is defined
implicitly by π :=  (1 + l) EI ( ), denoting
here the loss. Plainly, a positive loading, if any,
serves to cover administrative expenses in the
insurance business. Drèze (1981) related D to
l > 0, and to the agent’s relative risk aversion
His analysis provided the following bounds
and insights:5
Proposition 4. (Bounds on relative risk
aversion) Consider a risk-averse agent with
smooth concave utility function u (.) and wealth
who faces risk  and who can get cap-loss
indemnity I () := max { – D}at a premium
π = π (EI ( )) which depends only on the
actuarial value EI ( ). Let  Y :=  w – π – D
denote his income after deduction D. Then his
relative risk aversion R (Y )is bounded below
at the threshold income Yas follows:
Yu′′(Y)     l      Y
R (Y ) := – –––––  ≥  ––––– .
u′(Y)       1+ l  D
Equivalently, in terms of the relative risk
tolerance T (Y ) := 1/R (Y ) it holds that
1 + l    D
T (Y ) ≤ ––––– ––  .
lY
Consequently, a choice D = 0 would reflect
infinite relative risk aversion – or equivalently,
zero risk tolerance – on the part of the buyer.
The upshot here goes as follows: Full wage
reimbursement during short spell sickness reflects
that workers are infinitely risk averse.
Equivalently, they have no risk tolerance what-
soever when it comes to wage loss of short
duration. 
Such attitudes appear neither reasonable
nor plausible. Full coverage can hardly be
justified by commonly observed risk attitudes.
One observation suffices to put things right,
namely the presence of subsidies, making 
l < 0.
Still, could not full reimbursement be
justified in terms of additional, non-insurable
risk? I doubt it. Nonetheless, I shall pursue
that argument next. 
Should the Value of Leisure be
Insured?
Given the prevalence of insurance loading 
(l > 0) – legitimized by administrative costs in
insurance – why do we still observe contracts
with complete coverage? Their very existence
seems to speak against Mossin’s Proposition 1. 
Doherty and Schlesinger (1983) offered a
way out of this paradox. They found that
82 Sjur Didrik Flåm
4. Related studies include Drèze (1981), Gollier (1992), Huberman et al. (1983), Ermoliev and Flåm (2002),
Pashigan et al.(1966), Raviv (1979), and Smith (1968).
5. Relative to the threshold income Y := w – π – D Dreze used the approximation 
u′(w – π – x) ≈ u′(Y ) – (x – D )u′′(Y )
for the domain x ≤ D. Closer inspection reveals that the inequality
u′(w – π – x) ≥ u′(Y ) – (x – D )u′′(Y )
suffices in that domain. But the last inequality is satisfied automatically for a concave smooth u(.).
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risk might induce risko-phobe agents to
arrange for full indemnity even at an
actuarially unfair tariff. Intuitively, this result
hinges upon a positive association between
two types of risks: one insurable, the other
non-insurable. That is, when the insurable
risk is up (down), so is the non-insurable one
as well. 
A standard example comes with an
employer who may loose more than his
insurable opportunity cost when sickness
obliges him to be absent from his firm. The
productivity of his employees is then likely to
be lower, and that loss can hardly be covered
by insurance.6
Now, what about similar short-term
absence among employees? Besides the insured
risk, do fixed-wage workers face other positively
correlated, non-insurable risks that could justify
full coverage of the insurable one?
7
As said, the basic and insurable risk is here
the worker’s wage loss, stemming from short-
duration sickness and resulting absence from
paid work. Such sickness comes in diverse
degrees of severity, however, ranging from
light indisposure to full work-inability. If the
agent is only mildly hit, his value of attending
leisure remains positive. The worker is thus,
in principle and reality, exposed to a
composed, two-stage risk: First, he may fall
sick and thereby, if absent from work without
insurance, loose his salary. Second, during
work absence his illness might – or might not
– be so severe as to fully block desirable,
alternative activities. So, there is the prospect
of reaping some value of leisure.
8
To formalize, suppose a worker enjoys
smooth, strictly increasing, strictly concave
utility u(r) of monetary revenue r. When
working, he receives daily wage He faces a risk
of short-term (S for sickness for sickness)
causing income loss 
x > 0  with probability ps > 0
X := { 0  with probability 1 – pS.
The part I (X) ∈ [0, X] of that loss can be
recompensed via insurance, available at
premium π := (1 + l )ps per unit covered. As
customary, l is called the loading factor. It
usually is positive and reflects the costs of the
insurance provider. Of particular interest are
contracts of the form If (X) := fX, with 
f ∈  [0,1] denoting the fraction of loss
reimbursed. The purchase cost of If (.) is 
(1 + l ) fE (X).
Leisure tends to have positive monetary
value. However, if a worker is forced by
accidental illness to stay briefly away from
paid work, then most likely his value of leisure
is less than usual. One can hardly exclude
though that occasionally, in some situations,
a positive benefit accrues to the unfortunate,
sick worker. That benefit, in the form of
valuable leisure, may be construed as a partial
recompense for bad luck. I shall model this
feature by introducing uncertainty about the
economic value of leisure as perceived during
sickness and/or absence from paid work.
Specifically, let 
L > 0  with probability pL > 0
:= { 0  with probability 1 – pL.
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6. This simple observation prompts an immediate question: Why are employers not offered insurance for short
spell sickness?
7. Waiters and porters come to mind here. When sick, they experience a loss of wage and tips. I note that persons
facing such conditions have good incentives cover themselves fully – and to show up at work. So, the focus of
this paper is on fixed wage workers who obtain no extras.
8. For example, he can read, clean his car, or do some house work.
01 NOPEC 30 (2) Flåm  11-01-05  14:34  Side 83The risk (lottery)  is here seen as non-
insurable. No relation between the risk X  and
is assumed apart from the reasonable one
that pL⎟S   > 0. I naturally posit that w > L. As
usual, rational purchase of insurance assumes
the form of optimization: 
maximize Eu (w – P – X + L+1 (X )) subject
to I (X) ∈ [0, X], 
where P :=(1 + l ) EI (X ) is the total premium
for indemnity schedule I(.). Four scenarios,
labelled s = 1, ..., 4, must be kept in mind
here. These correspond to which – or how
many – risks have materialized. Their nature
and probabilities are spelled out in the table
above. 
For simplicity let ps, us, u′ s, denote the
probability, the utility, and the marginal
utility, respectively in state (or scenario) 
s= 1, ..., 4. To find a most desirable indemnity
schedule I(.) amounts a priori to 
maximize Eu = p1u1+ … + p4u4 with respect
to the insuranse policy I(.), 
subject of course to 0 ≤ I(x ) ≤ x for all x. For
the argument assume full coverage I(x ) = x is
optimal whence P = (1 + l )pSx. One may then
argue that9
(1 – pL⎟S)u′ 2+ pL⎟Su′ 4
(1 + l ) ≤ –––––––––––––– when I(x ) ≡x. (2)
(1 – pSpL⎟S)u′ 2+ p
4u′ 4
Note that u′ 2 > u′ 4 and pL⎟S  > p4. Therefore (2)
implies l < 0 whence we have
Proposition 5. (On partial insurance).
Suppose short spell sickness occasionally provides
a positive monetary value of associated leisure;
that is, suppose pL⎟S  > 0 with L > 0. Then the
loading of insurance premium must be negative
to justify full coverage for short-term sickness.10
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9. Since the objective is concave, full cover I(x) = fx with f = 1 is optimal iff   ∂
∂f Eu | f=1 ≥ 0, that is, iff 
– p1πu′1 + p2(1 – π)u′2  – p3πu′3 + p4(1 – π)u′4  ≥ 0 when I = x.
Now I (x) = x yields u′1 = u′2 = u′3 . Therefore the preceding inequality amounts to 
[– (1 – pSpL⎟S)π + p2] u′2 + p4(1 – π)u′4  ≥ 0 when I = x,
which can be reformulated as 
p2u′2 + p4u′4  π ≤ ––––––––––––––––– when I = x
(1 – pSpL⎟S)u′2 + p4u′4 
or equivalently as (2).
10. Note that this claim did not presume any sort of correlation between the two risks. The reason is that increased
value of leisure has no consequence when at work (scenario s = 3).
Table
scen (X, L) wage without insur. wage with insur. probability
1: (0,0) w w – P 1 – pS – pL + pSpL⎟S
2: (x,0) w – x w – P – x +I(x) pS (1 – pL⎟S)
3: (0,L) max {w, L} max {w, L} – P pL – pSpL⎟S
4: (x,L) w – x + L w – P – x + L + I(x) pSpL⎟S
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counter-factual. It is not! It perfectly fits a
setting where employees, or their unions,
think short spell sickness insurance is
subsidized (or ought be so). In fact, as of now,
so it is in Norway. 
I conclude this section, on the coupling
between work and leisure, by mentioning a
fairly extreme but interesting case. Suppose
someone – say, a young man – enjoys so robust
and perfect health that his risk of short spell
sickness is negligible during a specified period.
Suppose also that the same person faces great
uncertainty (or simply large variability) in the
monetary value  of his leisure. Being
guaranteed take-home wage w he obtains on
the average Eu (max{w,  }). Thus, while
intending to insure his labor income, one has
in fact insured the value of his leisure.
Admittedly, this arrangement is peculiar and
rather hard to justify. To reinforce the
absurdity suppose the person at hand is risk
neutral with respect to income. He obtains a
payoff (or utility) max{w,  } which is convex
in  . For that reason he would be willing to
pay for increased uncertainty. There is no
reason whatsoever to offer him insurance for
short spell absence. A fortiori, he would
hesitate in joining a mutual insurance
company. Other workers, of more common
sort, might want to join that company. Why
and how? I address that question next. 
Does Constant coverage fit Mutual
Insurance?
Many workers are members of a productive
cooperative. Others could, at least ideologi-
cally, be conceived of as such. Random
fluctuations in factor availability, including
labor, are then problematic. For mitigation of
stochastic ups and downs the members could
pool their resources. Pooling must be
generated and upheld by compensations (side
payments). For its viability the underlying
payment scheme had better be efficient,
incentive compatible, and ”equitable”. To
serve these ends cooperative game theory
advocates that a so-called core solution be
implemented. Such a solution amounts to
specify individual compensations that induce
overall efficiency and encourage no party to
defect or protest. 
In mutual insurance what determines a
core solution? It turns out that, in essence,
only two things come into play: first, the
aggregate (pooled) risk; second, the
”aggregate”, ”representative” preference; see
Baton and Lemaire (1981), Borch (1962),
Lemaire (1990), Magill and Quinzii (1996).
Broadly speaking, the contracting party who,
with relative ease, can carry risk will do so and
thereby be compensated by the others. If
members differ in risks and attitudes, the
sharing will neither be uniform nor
egalitarian. Most important, if systematic risk
still remains in the aggregate, it cannot be
eliminated at the level of each and every
individual. 
The following simple example brings out
some key points, touching upon efficiency
and sharing. Suppose some solidarity-
oriented, egalitarian, homogenous workshop
is plagued by high frequency sickness on
Mondays (or Fridays). One prototypical
worker retires and is to be replaced. Two
equally competent applicants knock at the
entrance door. One honestly says he is just
like the incumbent workers. The other can
reliably prove that he is sick less (or not more)
often than the average incumbent worker –
and never on Mondays (or Fridays). Which
candidate should be chosen? Does the anti-
correlated fellow merit a bonus? 
I conclude that an insurance policy for
short spell sickness which offers the same,
stable, stationary indemnity to everybody,
irrespective of idiosyncratic or aggregate risks,
Social insurance of short spell sickness? 85
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In the first place it is inefficient; in the second
it leaves some group worse off than alone. 
The first drawback is worrisome, but
concerning the last drawback one might
straightforwardly object by saying: The
purpose of social security is solidarity.
Consequently, fortunate groups should not
be allowed to defect. I have much sympathy
for this objection. It appears however,
somewhat misplaced here. Solidarity works
best for major risks, little affected by moral
hazard or adverse selection. Short spell
sickness is, almost by definition, a minor risk
– and certainly not immune to hidden action
or information. Anyway, the issue of solidarity
touches on how risks should be pooled, an
issue to which I turn next. 
Pooling over Persons or Periods
Insurance relies, both in theory and practice,
on two chief results of probability theory,
namely: the law of large numbers and the
central limit theorem (Henriet and Rochet,
1991). Crucial for their validity and
applicability is the independence (or quite
weak association) of the intervening risks.
Broadly speaking, independence (or weak
correlation) ensures that aggregate risks are
less variable than their constituent terms
might indicate. Aggregation and averaging
then applies to the entire pool of risk holders
– here the work force or some subclass thereof.
(The insurer can then apply the central limit
theorem to get good estimates of necessary
reserves – and of his ruin probability.) 
Probability theory points however, to
another average, namely that taken over time.
Under fairly weak conditions, called ergodicity
and apparently satisfied in the case of short
spell sickness, the two procedures are
equivalent (Stokey and Lucas, 1989). To state
this let S S denote a finite, exhaustive list of
possible states of health that regard short spell
sickness. Insisting here on transient durations
I posit that the typical worker’s health
situation moves randomly from state to state
– and is never permanently trapped in any
one of them.
Proposition 6. (Equivalence of population
and time averages) Consider a segment of the
work force that is homogenous with respect to
labor productivity and short spell sickness.
Denote by S S   a finite but exhaustive set of possible
states regarding short spell sickness. Suppose any
member of the segment at hand, if today in state
s  ∈  S S    will next work day reach any state 
s′∈S S   with positive probability Then there is a
unique steady state probability distribution πs
over S S, solving the system
Σ πspss′ = πs′ for all  s′∈  S S.
s ∈ S S
For any system of daily wages ws, s ∈  S S
– including work compensation, state-dependent
indemnity, and insurance premium – and for
any worker who experiences a random state
trajectory s (1), s (2),.... over his working days
1, 2, ..., it holds that
ws (1) + … + ws (T ) Σ πsws = lim ––––––––––––––– .
s ∈ S S T  + ∝ T
Time is here discrete and metered in work
days. Discounting is then fairly weak,
therefore ignored – and the planning horizon
is regarded as very distant. The assumption
that all pss′ > 0 can be considerably weakened.
It suffices that the eventual passage, during
some finite lapse of time, between any two
states s, s′ has positive probability; see Stokey
and Lucas (1989), Theorem 11.2. Anyway,
no single state s ∈ S S   – and no strict subset of
states – can be absorbing. In other words: one
86 Sjur Didrik Flåm
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space. This complies with the hypothesis that
all states concerning minor, short spell health
problems are recurrent and of finite duration
(think of flue or pain in a tooth). 
Proposition 6 says that, within a
homogeneous risk class, the frequencies of
diverse, relevant events over the population
coincide with those of a representative risk
over time. In other words: Cross sections and
time averages are equal. Consequently, for
small recurrent risks, instead of pooling with
others, the agent can ”pool with himself.” He
transfers thereby money from a happy, sunny
day to a less fortunate, rainy one. Instruments
for doing so abound. They are usually grouped
under the heading of precautionary savings;
see Kimball (1990), Leland (1968), and
Skinner (1988). 
Possibilities for Arbitrage?
As is well known, and increasingly visible,
there are close connections between insurance
and finance. Both fields provide instruments
for reallocating wealth or claims across states
and times. A fundamental concept in finance,
simpler than the notion of equilibrium, is that
of arbitrage (LeRoy and Werner, 2001). This
phenomenon refers to financial possibilities
of making guaranteed pure profit. Clearly, no
well-functioning financial market, and no
viable economic institution, could offer such
opportunities for extended periods. Bank-
ruptcy would soon ensue somewhere. 
The most simple instance of arbitrage
involves merely two papers: one always yields
lower net dividend than the other. If so, one
had better sell the first paper and use the
proceeds to buy the second. In financial
jargon: Take a short position in the first to
finance a corresponding long position in the
second. 
Does this elementary recipe apply to full
insurance for short spell sickness? I think it
does! One ”paper” is to receive wage com-
pensation for the dis-utility and effort that
might go along with work. The alternative
option is to receive the same wage, be relieved
of work dis-utility and enjoy some leisure. If
not subject to moral inhibition or social
disapproval, the latter choice appears most
attractive in any state of health. Consequently,
some employees are likely to exploit such
arbitrage opportunities to the full. When their
behavior eventually becomes widely adopted,
and maybe acquires the status of a tacit
convention, deliberate absence will only be
limited by imposed bounds. Competent
workers become rational shirkers. What is
lurking backstage here is, of course, a problem
of asymmetric information. Most persons know
their true state of health better than do others. 
Is asymmetric Information
accounted for?
It has by now acquired the status of common
knowledge that asymmetric information
causes problems for the design of efficient
insurance. Those problems stem for adverse
selection (hidden type) or moral hazard
(hidden action). They occur when unobserv-
able properties or actions affect economic
outcomes (Salanie, 1997). In the present
setting, the worker’s associates can hardly
ascertain whether he shirks – or has pursued
activities that render him less fit for work.
Therefore, to induce care and effort, the
employer (or the insurer) might want to use
tariffs that incorporate some degree of
coinsurance. Clearly, full reimbursement for
short spell sickness is at glaring variance with
such arrangements. 
Generally, asymmetric information calls
for personalized policies, typically taking the
form of non-linear indemnity schedules (e. g.
by embodying a deductible). Given a menu
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desirable. Two features appear fairly robust in
such a scenario: First, more comprehensive
coverage will come at higher unit premium;
second, more coverage will be chosen by
riskier agents. Again one sees that fully
egalitarian, uniform reimbursement for short
spell sickness is markedly at odds with a
composite menu. 
The severity of asymmetric information
is, of course, an empirical issue. While
contract theory has developed at rapid pace,
it still comprises fairly few empirical studies.
As pointed out by Chiappori (2001),
asymmetric information implies positive
correlation between two conditional distri-
butions. In that regard it seems interesting to
relate observed short spell sickness to weather,
holidays and jours de fetes. In short, there
should be ample room for empirical work. 
Problems with asymmetric information –
that is, with unobservables– might/should lead
one to mitigate the situation by using directly
observable features. These had better be
relevant for work absence, hard to dispute,
and difficult to change. Candidate features
include age, sex, working conditions, objec-
tive handicaps, number and age of dependant
family members etc. When accounting for
such factors, insurance contracts will become
manifold and the labor force more segmented. 
Should everybody be offered the
same policy?
If one insures different risks by one and the
same policy, transfers will flow from good to
less good groups. In our setting risks are
indeed different: the propensity to fall sick
during a short spell is not uniform across the
work force. So, how should social insurance
adapt to diversity and inhomogeneity? One
solution, viz. the one actually chosen in
Norway, is to ignore, for the very laudable
purpose of solidarity, all queries about self-
selection and tailor-made products. Then,
tacitly or implicitly, one accepts uniform
insurance of short spell sickness as a desirable,
albeit somewhat inefficient mechanism for
distributing income from lucky to unlucky
citizens. 
I do not refute this option. But I find it
somewhat easy and lacking in argument.
Could not other instruments serve better? To
wit, many personal features, bearing on short
spell absence, are immediately visible, non-
alterable, and immune to asymmetric
information. As said, relevant features include
age, sex, working conditions, care-load etc.
One might then, still with due consideration
of solidarity and reasonable transfers, design
diverse insurance schemes for short spell
sickness. For example, it appears reasonable
and justifiable to offer parents with infant
children, and persons with handicapped
dependants, better contracts than others
without. Admittedly, I am ill prepared, and
this is not the place, to engage that discussion
in greater detail. 
Concluding Remarks
Social insurance of minor, recurrent losses –
such as short spell loss of wage – must be seen
and evaluated from at least four viewpoints.
First, risk – when construed as a state-
dependent commodity, allocated over time
and contingencies – has some aspects of a
private commodity bundle. Second, there are
contractual arrangements and challenges that
must be investigated as such. Third, one
cannot avoid questions about equity and
solidarity.  Fourth, social insurance is an
institution. It reflects and affects values and
conventions in society at large. Could it
happen that some contracts weaken good and
widespread attitudes? I shall conclude by
briefly addressing each of these four aspects. 
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contingent indemnities, may fit the Arrow-
Debreu general notion of a private commodity
traded in competitive equilibrium. Just like
financial assets, the underlying treaty transfers
wealth across states and time. To the extent
that this view point is fitting, it indicates that
agents exposed to small, infrequent, recurrent
risks can tackle the related inconveniencies by
precautionary savings. The ergodic nature of
the underlying phenomenon tells that time
averages serves the same purpose as population
averages. In extremis, this speaks for self-
insurance. The problems with asymmetric
information then become less pressing. 
Second, insurance treaties are contracts,
written under asymmetric information, and
they suffer from incompleteness. Therefore
their design and implementation remains a
challenge and potentially, a source of dispute.
Since insurance generally is beset with moral
hazard (hidden action) and adverse selection
(hidden type), this last view seems most
appropriate. The Arrow-Debreu optic simply
ignores these crucial features. So, in theory
and practice, the specific design of short spell
sickness insurance had better rely on insights
offered by information economics and theories
of contracts. Those insights all stress the
importance of risk sharing or coinsurance. I
have indicated here above that on major
accounts the full coverage regime that
currently prevails in Norway, falls significantly
short of reasonable requirements. Plainly, why
should young healthy persons, having no
dependent family, be offered the same
contract as individuals with small children
and care-needing parents? 
Third, whether by intention or not,
insurance of short spell sickness redistributes
income across various groups and risks. In
that capacity it qualifies as object of scrutiny
for theories of social justice. Those theories
apply at best though, to risks that affect major
faculties and options. It seems doubtful
whether short-spell work incapacity – say,
during a day or two – falls directly into such
categories. At least one might beg leave to
doubt it. 
Fourth, in addressing widespread material
wants, much of social theory and practice
acknowledges the value and ethics of work.
Long ago Max Weber emphasized the great
respect Calvinism showed for everyday work.
Later studies on value systems stress their
dynamic features (Lindbeck and Nyberg,
1999). Regarding the dynamics of work ethics
it seems risky to let the individual, economic
value attached to showing up at work (at best)
equal that of absence.
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